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Introduction
For seven years, the Embassy of Ghana in Washington, D.C., USA, was not just a diplomatic hub but the passive host to a sophisticated “shadow mission,” a network of unauthorised websites and staff-linked entities that diverted 19 million dollars from hopeful applicants. From the discovery of blank biometric passports hidden in a desk drawer to the “hurried removal” of computer hard drives just before auditors arrived, the Auditor-General’s forensic report reveals the exploitation of the state’s digital infrastructure.
At the centre of this rot was Fred Brian Kwarteng. He was a local temporary Information/Communication Technology (ICT) Officer at the Embassy of Ghana in Washington, D.C., whose tenure spanned from November 2016 to May 2025. While officially tasked with managing the mission’s digital infrastructure, the audit concludes that Kwarteng used his position and administrative access to construct a multi-million-dollar “shadow mission” for personal gain amounting to over $19 million.
This explainer provides an understanding of the special audit report conducted by the Audit Service covering the period from January 2017 to June 2025. The full report can be found here.
The Architect of the Digital Diversion ($19 million)
- Mailing (Dispatch and Handling) Fees ($4.58 Million Gain)
Kwarteng’s most significant impact was the redirection of official consular traffic. Between 2019 and 2025, he embedded HTML anchor tags and pop-up notices directly into the source code of the embassy’s official website. These redirects forced visa and passport applicants away from official channels and onto private platforms he controlled, such as ghanapv.org and travelghana.net.
Kwarteng designed these private sites to mimic the Embassy, utilising the Ghana Coat of Arms and the name “Embassy of Ghana” to mislead applicants into believing they were official government portals. Once applicants were on these private platforms, they were compelled to pay fees for services that the Embassy was either required to provide free of charge or at a lower cost. Kwarteng charged a standardised, mandatory fee of US$29.75 for return postage. The audit determined that the actual average postage cost was only US$10.10, meaning Kwarteng and his associates retained a massive profit margin on every application, resulting in a total estimated gain of US$4.58 million.
- Application Support Charges ($14.34 Million Gain): Between 2021 and 2025, Fred Brian Kwarteng’s platforms levied unauthorised “support service charges” for both visa and passport applications. These unauthorised fees ranged from $68.78 to $76.78 for visas and $67 for passports. According to the audit, these charges, which were not part of official statutory fees, generated an estimated $14 million.
These two infractions generated the bulk of the $19 million for Fred Brian Kwarteng’s personal gain.
Financial Manoeuvres and Conflict of Interest
Beyond the website, Kwarteng was linked to several internal financial irregularities:
Stefrann LLC: The Embassy paid nearly US$300,000 to a non-existent company called Stefrann LLC for renovation work at the Ambassador’s residence. Citibank, the bank the mission deals with, flagged these transactions as suspicious. The mission’s chief treasury officer later confirmed Kwarteng was the owner of this “fictitious” entity, but little to nothing was done.
Square Gateway Overcharges: In 2020, Kwarteng recommended the Square payment gateway as the online merchant service provider for processing consular fees. He, however, embedded an unauthorised $1.00 “service charge” into the proposal. This resulted in applicants being overcharged by 19% to 52% above Square’s authorised rates. These funds were funnelled through a network of private entities Kwarteng created or operated, including Ghana Travel Consult (GTC), Secure Data Centre LLC, and Travel Ghana LLC.
Security Breaches and Forensic Risks
The audit’s most alarming findings regarding Kwarteng involved the unauthorised possession of sensitive materials. During a search of his office in 2025, auditors discovered 18 passport booklets, including four blank biometric booklets and one featuring Kwarteng’s own image. 59 used and unused visa stickers, suggesting the handling of consular materials outside official processes. When auditors arrived to inspect his computer, they found the Solid State Drive (SSD) had been forcefully removed, effectively deleting operating system logs, emails, and transaction records that could have served as critical evidence.
Administrative Shadows
The audit revealed that Kwarteng’s very presence at the Mission was fraught with lapses. His official file was incomplete, lacking academic certificates, professional credentials, or any independent verification of his qualifications. Furthermore, there was no proof of his legal right to work in the United States. Despite being queried for unauthorised website modifications as early as 2019, his contract was repeatedly renewed until his ultimate termination on May 25, 2025.
Who were his co-conspirators?
The audit specifically highlights two senior officers who played central roles in enabling Kwarteng’s financial and consular schemes. They are the Chief Treasury Officer, Janet Maku Koranteng, and the Minister, Consular Amidu Mohammed Karande.
Janet Maku Koranteng facilitated the financial structures used by Kwarteng. She authorised payments to Stefrann LLC, a company she confirmed was owned by Kwarteng. She also accepted Kwarteng’s recommendation to use the Square payment gateway, which carries embedded unauthorised fees.
Amidu Mohammed Karande participated in and was copied on numerous email exchanges that directed official consular business to Kwarteng’s private platforms.
The others include former ambassador/head of mission Alima Mahama, head of Chancery Genevieve Edna Apaloo, and former minister, consular Joseph Ngminebayihi.
Kwarteng’s Defense
In his responses to the audit, Kwarteng framed himself as a selfless contributor to the mission. He claimed he developed the AppTrack biometric attendance system and integrated QuickBooks as part of his “contributions,” often without compensation. He described himself as an “experienced cybersecurity professional and Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH)” and argued that his private platforms were intended to modernise and streamline the embassy’s “manual” processes for the public’s benefit. He consistently denied that his actions constituted fraudulent activity or mimicry for unjust enrichment.
What happened to Fred Kwarteng?
After this incident was uncovered, Fred Kwarteng had his appointment officially terminated on May 25, 2025.
Recommended Sanctions and Legal Action
The Auditor-General has made several recommendations regarding Kwarteng’s conduct. The audit recommends recovering $19 million from Kwarteng and other “key actors” involved. It also recommended that he be sanctioned under Section 95 of the Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038), for his role in embedding unauthorised redirects into the Embassy’s official website for personal gain. Under the Act, Kwarteng, if convicted, is liable to a term of imprisonment of not less than two years and not more than five years or both.
